This paper explores the determinants of share repurchase decisions within the context of a modern conceptual framework. Empirically, it categorizes such determinants by firm size, stage of the product life cycle, membership in the technology sector, ownership of overseas cash reserves, and institutional ownership. Share repurchases were used to boost earnings per share temporarily. Such effects dissipated over 1 year and 5 years. Certain categories of firms used share repurchase to grow through acquisitions, while others used share repurchase to prevent takeovers. This paper is the first study to examine share repurchase through categories of determinants within the context of short and long-term post-share repurchase performance.
Introduction
Corporate finance recognizes shareholder wealth maximization as its core goal.
To maximize shareholder wealth, managers must take advantage of growth opportunities by accepting positive net present value projects. Free cash flow generated from these projects may be returned to shareholders in the form of dividends or share repurchase [1] . [2] observed the growth of share repurchase expenditures at an average annual rate of 26.1%.
The relative popularity of the share repurchase option may be attributed to its effect on earnings. Share repurchase reduces the equity base of the firm, thereby automatically increasing earnings per share (EPS). As earnings per share is net income/number of shares outstanding, by reducing the number of shares outstanding, share repurchase increases earnings per share. Every quarter, invest-R. Abraham [3] . Conversely, firms that fail to meet the EPS estimate (negative earnings surprises) release a negative signal depressing security returns and inviting individual and investor concern. Inadvertently, the ability of share repurchase to increase earnings per share may exacerbate the positive signal of a positive earnings surprise and lessen the severity of a negative earnings surprise. In a study of large UK firms, [4] observed that earnings per share reacted positively in the immediate aftermath of a stock repurchase. In the pre-social media era, investors scrutinized the firm's financial decisions for signals of positive or negative future performance. Investors viewed the share repurchase as evidence that the firm had excess cash for distribution to shareholders, thereby boosting stock prices. During this period, market signals from share repurchase served an informational purpose in that they signaled that the firm was cash-rich (free cash flow theory), was capable of earning positive future cash flows (signaling hypothesis), buying stock to compensate managers (option refunding theory), or choosing to compensate shareholders with stock in lieu of dividends (dividend substitution theory). This paper addresses the current literature's alternate theoretical conceptualizations of share repurchase, addressing their limitations in describing modern market conditions. Then, it sets forth a new conceptualization of share repurchase for a world in which the Internet has rendered information a free good, so that share repurchase decisions have become a supplement to further increase the earnings per share of firms that undertake successful investment in profit-making projects. Finally, the empirical study has the unique features of 1) measuring the motivations for share repurchase decisions in the modern era, 2) measuring the impact of share repurchase on short-term and long-term earnings per share over contemporaneous, 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year periods, and 3) using size, product life-cycle, technology, overseas cash ownership, and institutional ownership subsamples. The limitation of the study in that it relies on COMPUSTAT data which is confined to US firms, so that the results may not be generalizable internationally. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is an Introduction, Section 2 is the Literature Review and Hypotheses Development, Section 3 is the Methodology, Section 4 consists of Results, and Section 5 presents Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research.
after which any excess was distributed to the shareholders as dividends or used to repurchase stock. It follows that cash-rich firms with few profitable projects will spend fewer funds on these projects than their counterparts with less cash and a large number of profit-making opportunities (see [6] , for a review). Accordingly, cash-rich firms will distribute excess cash flows as shareholders will object to these funds being invested in unprofitable investments.
Signaling Hypothesis
The signaling hypothesis's popularity ( [7] [8], see [1] , for a review) stems from its position that stock repurchases are undertaken by firms that are undervalued, signaling superior future cash flows. Surveys by [9] and [10] found that managers were keen to signal successful future performance. [11] posited that share repurchases occur when shares are undervalued so that the repurchase transfers stock from selling shareholders to non selling insiders. The market is unaware of the identities of buyers and sellers and continues to undervalue the stock in the post-repurchase period. [12] observed a significant correlation between positive abnormal stock returns and the private information motivating the purchase of stock by insiders.
Option Refunding
Yet another early theory pertains to the need for firms to maintain an inventory of stock through share repurchase to fund executive stock option programs and fund stock mergers. For stock mergers, acquirers offer holders of target stock shares in the consolidated, post-acquisition firm at premium stock prices. This stimulates them to repurchase their own stock for such sales to be undertaken.
Given the small volume of stock mergers in relation to all mergers ( [13] ), it is possible that such option refunding may also not be a significant source of shares repurchased. Further, stock mergers release a strong negative signal that the firm lacks cash, stimulating managers to avoid this form of merger. This contention is borne out by surveys of executives which show option refunding as a less important impetus for share repurchase, particularly over time, with [10] and [14] finding diminishing importance for option refunding compared to earlier surveys of managers [9] .
Dividend Substitution
The final theory of share repurchase is dividend substitution. 
Rationale for a New Framework
With the advent of the Internet, hitherto private information has become public, so that information asymmetry has lessened. Managers formerly had sole access to information about the firm's investments in new products, the fate of existing products, the deployment of human capital and the pursuit of new markets. The dissemination of news instantaneously through social media has revealed this information to the investment community. Individual investors may make projections of firm decision-making ability and, in turn, performance, based on the news, without having to rely on signals from dividend payouts or share repurchases. Therefore, the signaling theory's dominance is compromised.
The dividend substitution theory has diminished in value as well. In the pre-Internet world, high dividend payout ratios signaled a stable level of earnings to prevail at a steadily growing rate into the future. Yet, in the decade after the advent of the Internet, [15] observed in surveys of managers that there was extreme reluctance to cut dividends. Managers preferred to forego certain profit-making projects to preserve dividends at the existing level. Sixty-five percent of survey respondents preferred to raise external funds before reducing dividends. What is the adverse consequence of dividend reduction that management wishes to prevent so steadfastly? A reduction in dividends signals financial distress and bankruptcy. Since it is the norm to pay out some level of dividends, the only incremental information conveyed by dividends is that their reduction indicates the firm's inability to achieve a minimum level of earnings. The informational role of share repurchase is limited. Share repurchase, by definition, increases earnings per share by reducing the number of shares outstanding. This outcome could generate positive earnings surprises and boost stock returns for the forthcoming quarter. [16] found that the reduction in stock returns from the conversion of convertible bonds to stock was 2.5% less when this conversion was combined with share repurchase as the increase in earnings per share from share repurchase partially offsets the reduction in stock returns from the convertible bond conversion. As neither dividends nor share repurchase convey information about future performance, and since they have different informational roles, i.e. 
The New Paradigm
The assumptions of a [17] Is it growing through acquisition of product innovators if it does not wish to invest in in-house research and development? Annual reports, Form 10Ks, investment analyst reports, 24-hour electronic and social media can supplement technical reports with news items, anecdotes, personal opinion, tweets, and blogs to respond to these queries. Firm value is viewed in terms of the earning power of assets, not the signaling power of market imperfections, such as dividends and shares repurchased. [17] proposed the investment opportunities approach to the market valuation of assets. Real assets may be tangible, such as manufactured products, or intangible such as inventions, patents, copyrights, brand loyalty, or market access. They posit that the value of the firm is the present value of a perpetuity of profits composed of some proportion of profit attributable to these real assets together with profits generated by existing investments in real assets.
Large firms, with large cash reserves may grow through acquisitions, i.e. they may purchase another firm, rather than undertaking their own research and development, such as a large pharmaceutical firm. Alternatively, they could purchase another firm in a cash or stock merger to diversify risk. The stock merger provides the impetus for acquiring stock through cash repurchase to exchange with target shareholders. H1: For all firms, retained earnings will significantly predict the decision to repurchase shares.
H2: For large firms, investment in target firms with high levels of research and development expenditure, will significantly predict the decision to repurchase shares.
Given that this model assumes that a level of dividend payout is set by management, and is maintained into the future for fear of adverse signaling, followed by investment in positive NPV projects, followed by share repurchase, a firm would have to be cash-rich in order to meet all of the dividend, profit-making, and share repurchase objectives. It follows that large, mature or declining "cash cow" industries will continue to generate a stream of cash into the for seeable future. They may be in a position to increase dividends.
H3: For large, mature, and declining firms, dividends will significantly predict shares repurchased. 
Methodology

Sample and Data Collection
The income statements and balance sheets of firms contained in the entire data- Table 2 . Subsamples were created on the basis of 1) size (total assets > the median were termed "large," while total assets < the median were designated as "small," 2) product life-cycle, (firm missions and descriptions categorized them as "introductory," "growth," "maturity," and "decline"), 3) technology intensity (firms with SIC codes in the technology sector, designated as "technology-intensive," and those with non-technology SIC codes designated as "non-technology-intensive"), 4) the firms with an overseas cash hoard identified by [18] designated as "overseas cash," and 5) firms with "institutional ownership" designated as such.
Hypotheses Testing
Variables were extracted from both income statements and balance sheets (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of variables).
Equations
The following logistic regression equations were specified, 
SHBY t = Binary coded dichotomous variable with value = 1 for firms that repurchased shares and value = 9 for firms that did not repurchase shares; ACQ t = Value of acquisitions; DEP t = Depreciation expense; DIV t = Dividends; EBITDA t = Earnings before interest and taxes; RET t = Retained Earnings; REV t = Revenue; RD t = Research and development expense; CF t = Cash flow; RDACQ t = Research and development expense of acquisitions; BETA t = Beta coefficient; LTDA t = Long-term debt to assets; DA t = Debt to assets; NG t = Negative surprises, 1 = no surprise, 2 = negative surprise; PS t = Product or service, 1 = product, 2 = service; INSTOWN t = percentage of institutional ownership.
All variables were logarithmically transformed. Variables with coefficients β 1 to β 10 were employed to test the hypotheses. Control variables such as long term debt to assets ratio, debt ratio, negative surprises, and product or service orientation were added to control for their influence on share repurchase. Debt ratios measure the firm's borrowing to repurchase shares. A firm that has had a history 
EPSCONT t = EPS at time of repurchase; EPS1 t+1 = EPS, 1 year after repurchase; EPS5 t+5 = EPS, 5 years after repurchase; SHBUY t = Number of shares repurchased; NETINC t = Net income at time of repurchase; REV t = Revenue at time of repurchase.
Results
As shown in Table 2 , hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 -11 were fully supported. Hypothesis 3 was partly supported for large and declining firms, though not for mature firms. There may be evidence of a rational investor, frictionless markets environment espoused by [17] . Businesses focus on producing profitable products in growing markets. All firms capitalize on growth opportunities by reinvesting through increased retained earnings. Dividends are maintained at a steady, possibly gradually increasing level for declining firms, to maintain investor confidence. The cash flow theory does not apply for large, mature, or declining firms in that it assumes that these firms have no growth potential so that they distribute excess cash to shareholders. This paper finds that such firms may embark on growth through acquisitions, investing in the research and development of acquisitions. Additional funds for investment may be provided by depreciation tax shields. Some firms, which are non-technology intensive even invest in in-house research and development. Any cash remaining after these investments may be employed to repurchase shares, temporarily increasing EPS. Growth firms invest in risky acquisitions, though not in the research and development investment of acquisitions. Presumably, they perform internal research and development, with any excess funds being used to repurchase shares. Introductory Table 3 ).
